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Poland on the eve of EU membership

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Editor's Overview

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At its Copenhagen summit in December 2002 the EU agreed to welcome, from May 2004, up to 10 new members in what, without any doubt, will be the most challenging widening of the Union to date. Previous enlargements were comparatively sedate affairs involving at most 3 or 4 usually rich countries with similar economic structures and operating systems. The next enlargement will be different in three main respects. It involves a very large number of new members, they are much poorer than those already in the club and they are still grappling with the effects of system transformation from communism to the highly liberal (free market) capitalism currently in vogue.

In anticipation of Copenhagen, the Polish Consul-General in Scotland, Mr Wojciech Tycinski, decided that the time was right to mount an event that would draw greater attention to the coming enlargement and to Poland's place in it. He also wanted, gently, to remind us that *Poland-Scotland* is a part of Scotland's rich international cultural heritage, but one perhaps that needs dusting down and a new coat of paint.

Five speakers were invited to reflect, at a conference held in Edinburgh on November 18th, on various aspects of change and post-communist transformation in the light of Poland's accession to the EU. In this **Occasional Paisley Paper** we have gathered together those contributions to make more widely available a unique 'take' on an important process that is still attracting too little attention in the mainstream media both here in Scotland and in the UK. Indeed, even the momentous decision that was made in Copenhagen barely made it onto the front pages of our broadsheets. This is not a good sign. The EU will change fundamentally in 2004, perhaps in ways difficult to chart or imagine, and yet very few Europeans are engaged by it. Our modest hope is that the short papers in this collection, produced by Scottish and Polish experts, will help redress the balance, and contribute to informing and stimulating wider discussion.

George Reid MSP, the deputy presiding officer in the Scottish parliament, opened the Edinburgh conference and his words of welcome, laced with history, set an excellent context for our discussion. History, geopolitics, displacement and aspiration figure strongly in our opening paper where Rick Fawn, an international relations specialist from St Andrews University, reminds us that Poland's 'move west', its 'return to Europe' has not been straightforward. For the next EU enlargement, unlike any other before it, candidates had to meet demanding political and economic entry criteria. Even EU-enthusiastic Polish politicians wearied. Frustrations multiplied. A former Polish prime minister complained that it was difficult to stomach the underlying sentiment that Poland, the birthplace of Solidarity in 1980, and the West's darling for a long time afterwards, was, in the post-Communist 1990s considered by many in western Europe to be a 'problem'. Looking ahead however to the post 2004 EU, Rick Fawn draws attention to a new geopolitics where Poland can become pivotal in shaping the EU's eastern policy, its policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and of course Russia. Indeed, he goes further and spots a unique opportunity and role for Poland as the potential leader of an 'eastern' regional lobby in the soon to be 25-member EU.

Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, formerly president of the Polish central bank and now with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London, turns to the economics of EU enlargement repeating the case that all-round benefits exist. This is, she says, no 'zero-sum game'. That view, widely accepted for the *longer run*, conceals however the problems of short term dislocation that will affect countries and regions at different times. From a Scottish perspective we know about this already, from first hand recent experience of relocation of manufacturing plants to low cost labour destinations. But new business opportunities, as Gronkiewicz-Waltz hints, will arise in Central Europe from 2004 and in Scotland we should be aware of them: the region, after all, is likely to boom as EU aid flows kick-in. For the longer term, in the enlarged EU, there will be room too for a wider economic, social and political debate. Not all of us are as convinced, as Gronkiewicz-Waltz seems to be, that Europe can only be successful once it installs Anglo-Saxon capitalism US style. We can also see in early 2003, in relation to Iraq, that central European governments and leaders are more disposed to Washington/London than Berlin/Paris.

Clare McManus-Czubinska is a political scientist from Glasgow University and she and her colleagues direct our attention to internal tensions on the Polish domestic political scene where, despite the 1990s march westwards, Euroscepticism is alive and kicking. This is a sensitive matter, especially in the first months of 2003 as Poland gears up for its accession referendum. The McManus-Czubinska team detects in Polish Euroscepticism a fear of the unknown, an X-factor that coalesces those groups that have done badly, or at least much less well than others, in the transformation period.

Next we turn to a leading Warsaw sociologist, Ireneusz Krzeminski, who reports some fascinating research on what makes Polish society 'tick'. He identifies a general lack of trust and co-operation. 'Civil society' is hugely underdeveloped. Moreover, he continues, this is something that can only partly be blamed on communism. Krzeminski's studies of social activism in the 1990s suggest that some of the weaknesses in building new models of active citizenship probably stem partly from the fact that the post 1989 transformation did not engage the mass of society. The 1990s post-Communist order was built as a 'top down' project in social and economic engineering.

Nothing could be further removed from projects of social engineering, the bone dry Copenhagen or Maastricht criteria, than Richard Demarco's long-standing affection for Poland, Polish art and theatre, his appeal to the soul in the Scottish-Polish relationship. As unofficial cultural ambassador to Poland since 1968 Richard Demarco, from his well-known Edinburgh base, has been bridging the artificial East-West (Yalta) divide with exhibitions, events, publications and people. Here, with his friend and long time collaborator the Polish artist, Zbigniew Makarewicz, we find the story of the post-war Polish-Scottish arts connection. Makarewicz couldn't easily find his Poland in the People's Republic but he tells us 'we found our Poland in Scotland', a warm tribute, one that it is worth drawing attention to in these post September 11th days when the space for cultural tolerance is being relentlessly squeezed. Polish artists are also finding that the new post-communist order generates problems: the censor has gone – and good riddance – but the money has evaporated too and that's not so welcome. Arts activists know only too well how difficult it is to maintain exhibition/events/contacts and business sponsors are not always easy to find.

So, Poland is on the way back to Europe, and we hope that this collection of short papers, snapshot though it is, will help us all to understand better what that may mean.

Polish-Scottish links, as George Reid notes, go back a long way. He reminds us of the Scottish merchants who travelled East, of the Chalmers who became *Czammers*, the Ramsays and the *Ramzys*, and '*Danzig Willie*' too. Elsewhere, another Scot and long term friend of Poland, Neal Ascherson, tells us about '*lugless Will*' (Will Lithgow) who travelled around 17th century central Europe, bumping into the Dicksones in Kraków, William Bailey in Gdansk and many others¹. But in his recent writing Ascherson has most to say about contemporary Scotland where he detects in our society a 'St Andrew's Fault', 'the traumatic chasm dividing the confident minority from the mistrustful majority'. This must surely be, in the language of the modern Scottish executive, a major impediment to the 'smart, successful Scotland' that it wants to build. It is interesting that in our collection Krzeminski hits on something similar in his post-1989 Poland. Perhaps our two societies have more in common than we realise?

My colleague at the University of Paisley, Chik Collins, has researched this at the micro level in Ferguslie Park, a depressed housing scheme near Paisley, where he detected a deteriorating social fabric, one where independent community organisation was dangerously depreciated by official actions of various sorts². Strange that one of the common problems both Scotland and Poland, each with new parliaments, may be facing is how to engage citizens in civic discussion and political activity. It is hard here to dispel a gut feeling that a better, more genuinely inclusive society is likely to be grounded in a fairer distribution of income and wealth. Unfortunately, both UK and US governments seem stuck in economic philosophies that continue to place too much store in purely private, individual routes to material well-being, downgrading the role of public service and social solidarity. Edinburgh seems not quite so wedded to that liberal political economy but is under pressure to conform. Warsaw/Gdansk once spoke loudly about solidarity but the voice has been getting quieter since 1989.

¹ Neal Ascherson, **Stone Voices: The Search for Scotland** (Granta, London, 2002).

² See Chik Collins, 'Urban Policy, "Modesty" and "Misunderstanding": On the Mythology of 'Partnership' in Urban Scotland' in George Blazyca ed., **Restructuring Regional and Local Economies: Towards a Comparative Study of Scotland and Upper Silesia**, (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003), (forthcoming).

Poland is 'returning to Europe' and May 2004 looks, in this context to be a particularly significant date. But too much 'EUphoria' could be a bad thing. We should not lose sight of the fact that May 2004 will not be 'The End'. On the contrary, it will mark the beginning of immense changes in Europe that we have only started to think through. Let me conclude by thanking all our authors for their thoughtful contributions to this complex process. I must also give special thanks to Wendy Blazyca for encouragement, support and critical 'edge'. Finally, I should point out that the views expressed in the pages that follow are those of the authors alone and should not be attributed either to the editor or the Polish Consulate in Edinburgh whose financial support towards this publication is gratefully acknowledged.

Opening Remarks

George Reid MSP

Deputy Presiding Officer - The Scottish Parliament

On behalf of all of us in the Scottish Parliament, I very much welcome this important conference. As our now First Minister, Jack McConnell, speaking on Scotland's role inside the European Union, said in Cracow last year:

'With our outward looking tradition, we Scots fully endorse the position of the UK government as a champion of enlargement.'

Scotland and Poland have, of course, been trading and economic partners for centuries. These relations have grown in importance since the collapse of communism in 1989. We very much welcome the fact that Poland – the largest of the accession countries, with its market of 40-million people – has spearheaded economic reform in Central Europe and we look forward to even closer links in the decade ahead.

History has a habit of repeating itself.

The 15th century saw the first Scots students attending the Jagellonian University in Cracow and the first Scots merchants settling in Gdansk. In the 16th century, a significant part of the Polish Army was composed of Scots soldiers, fighting with you against the Muscovites, the Swedes and the Turks. Indeed, the defence of Gdansk in 1571 was entrusted to six Scottish companies of infantry, commanded by Colonel William Stewart of Huston. At the same time, the great magnate family of Radziwills kept a private army recruited largely from North East Scotland.

By the 17th century, there were some 30,000 Scots settled in Poland. Some like William Forbes – ‘Danzig Willie’ as he was known here – became a significant financier. Others were raised to the nobility. In Polish phone books today you find Ramsays who have become Ramzys, Chalmers who have become Czarmas, Dawsons who have become Dassons. Gdansk still has many Scottish street names and, in its hinterland, there are villages like Skotna Gora and Szotniki.

Poland handsomely returned that investment during the Second World War, when Scotland was defended by 70,000 troops of the 1st Polish Army. Indeed the village in which I grew up, Tullibody, had in the 1940s more Poles than Scots as inhabitants. In this country today there are some 10,000 people of direct Polish descent, a community that has immeasurably enriched Scotland by its industry, culture and joie de vivre.

With the establishment of the Scottish Parliament three and a half years ago, this old European country is beginning again to reach out to its neighbours.

On the Mound, we are very active in External Affairs. The First Minister, who is also the President elect of the congress of European regions with legislative powers, is proactive in seeking a stronger regional voice in the future governance of the European Union. If there is to be an EU of the peoples, he has said, then it has at least in part to be built bottom up.

So what can we bring, from Edinburgh, to the accession states? We can add value to British foreign policy, I believe, in four areas:

First, in Scotland, we have very extensive experience of European structural funds. Our network of development agencies has an impressive track record in identifying projects and in securing finance for them in Brussels. The Scottish government leads in a partnership project in Prague to transfer knowledge in this area to the Czechs. There is also involvement in Estonia and, with Poland, through COSLA. Our expertise has been made freely available to many Poles passing through Edinburgh.

Second, there are good trading prospects on both sides. UK exports to Poland last year were worth around £1.3bn and imports only a little less. A significant part of our exports were in high tech office equipment made in Scotland – and in the fields of energy, IT and electronics, the environment, water and waste management and the financial sector there are good prospects. In this respect, I very much welcome the announcement this week of the establishment of Pro Polonia as a one-stop shop for your exporters and for foreign investors. That should ease some of the difficulties Scottish companies have experienced in having to deal with a number of different agencies.

Third, we have in Scotland a rich and vibrant voluntary sector. It fills the gap as the state contracts and it contributes around £3bn annually to the social economy. Communism, with its top-down command-and-control mechanisms, did not leave much scope for the citizen to engage in voluntary work. But there can be no true civic society without it. You will find our NGOs – active in such fields as Mothers Against Drugs, Care for the Elderly, Equal Rights for disabled people – ready to dialogue, and perhaps more, with yours.

And lastly, our Parliament is built on four fundamental principles:

- ?? Accessibility
- ?? Accountability
- ?? Equality of Opportunity
- ?? The Sharing of Power.

We believe these principles are exportable. We believe, in a citizen's Europe, that they are a good yardstick to measure how we are governed. We have developed a series of innovative means of putting them into practice – a highly developed petitions system, including electronic petitioning; regular

consultative assemblies of interest groups meeting in the Chamber; our Committees sitting regularly throughout Scotland – and these innovations in governance may be of interest to your parliamentarians.

Poland today stands on the eve of EU Membership. Today is an important day for Polish-Scottish dialogue. Let us learn from each other. Let us hear your hopes and ambitions for your country. We welcome Poland back to where it rightly belongs, in the European family.

**Placing Poland:
Partners and Prospects in Polish Foreign Policy on the Eve
of EU Accession**

Rick Fawn

University of St Andrews

Introduction

A country's objective geographical place and the subjective geopolitical perceptions or aspirations of its population do not necessarily coincide. This is perhaps particularly true of Poland, the borders of which have shifted profoundly over the past millennium. As Raymond Buell wrote in the fateful year of 1939: 'Poland's foreign policy, to a greater extent than that of most countries, is governed by history and geography'.³

After 1945, Poland's western border was moved to the Oder/Odra River,⁴ which placed the country more westward than Hungary. The Polish population within Poland's borders was unprecedentedly consolidated – the result first of wartime genocide and then of the postwar relocation of minorities into and out of the country.

But any collective Polish psychological outlook that resulted from the country having been shifted westward was of course thwarted in practice by Soviet domination and the submergence of the country into communist bloc structures. Not only was Poland's postwar foreign minister a Soviet citizen but the country was deeply and firmly integrated into the bilateral and multilateral forms of Soviet rule. Polish resistance of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980-81 that punctuated this era nevertheless still showed the power and seeming durability of the Soviet order.

³ Raymond L. Buell, **Poland: Key to Europe** (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), p. 308.

The end of communist rule with a coalition government in 1989 brought challenges and opportunities for realignments in Polish foreign policy. This paper outlines some of those changes, starting with the immediate shifts in post-communist Polish foreign policy.

Post-communist Polish foreign policy

As much as Poland sought to re-establish its European historical lineage, the legacy of Soviet rule remained dominant in the initial period following the end of the communist monopoly on power in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990. For Poland in particular, this time represented uncertainty and produced foreign policy ironies. Many feared the potential consequences of German unification. French commentator François Mauriac declared that he loved Germany so much that he was glad there were two of them. American political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote of European geopolitics going 'back to the future' of the late 1930s, where distrust among states resulted in states, at best, deceiving each other or going to war.⁵

For Poland, concerns emerged when Bonn was not immediately forthcoming in reassurances that the Polish-German border would not be revised. Furthermore, discussions of German unification in 1990 occurred in the '2+4' format: the two Germanies and the four wartime allies of the Soviet Union, USA, Britain and France. Poland, and other concerned neighbours like Czechoslovakia, were obviously excluded. While some members of the German government gave assurances that the border would not be changed, in 1990 Chancellor Kohl made repeated statements that the border could only be affirmed *after* German unification occurred.⁶ In these circumstances, the US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger even reassured Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in February 1990 that no new Yalta would occur and Poland would not be sold out.⁷

⁴ This river demarcation is generally referred to in English-language sources as Oder-Neisse, and in Polish as Odra-Lusatian-Nysa.

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', **International Security** (Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990).

⁶ See Manfred Görtemaker, **Unifying Germany 1989-1990**, (London: Macmillan, 1994), esp. p. 168.

⁷ Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, **Germany Unified and Europe Transformed** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 208.

In these circumstances, the 'dual track' foreign policy of Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski appeared all the more sound: maintaining relations with the Soviet Union but favouring the West. Nevertheless, in 1990, Polish foreign policy contemplated the remarkable idea of the retention of the Warsaw Pact and of Soviet forces in Poland. Poland was one of the first five countries to recognise the independence of Ukraine, doing so before the USSR formally ended in December 1991. Ukraine continues to feature prominently in Poland eastern policy.

Any fears of German territorial demands, let alone aggression, have since dissipated, and Polish-German rapprochement since 1990 has been compared in importance to Franco-German reconciliation. Indeed, Germany would prove important to Poland's campaign for entry into NATO and the EU.

Before considering the overarching aims of post-communist Polish foreign policy this paper briefly considers developments in the country's immediate geopolitical neighbourhood.

Poland's immediate geopolitics

When one concentrates on Poland without reference to its two larger neighbours, the country's relative power becomes apparent. By both demographics and geography, Poland is the region's major power. With a population of over 38 million, it dwarfs Hungary and the Czech Republic at 10 million each, and makes Slovakia and the Baltic states even more modest. Poland's landmass is four times that of the Czech Republic and over six times Slovakia's.

This relative geopolitical prominence also meant that some regional post-communist possibilities were stillborn. Foremost was the tentative idea mooted in January 1990 by Zbigniew Brzezinski that Poland and Czechoslovakia form a federation. While the legacy of dissident-era co-operation was strong among the new elites of both countries, the Czechoslovaks feared the disproportionate Polish influence.

Among new regional initiatives **Visegrád** co-operation, formally started in February 1991 at a meeting of the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, was one of the most important, laudable and ambitious. Inspired by the ideals of communist era dissident co-operation it aimed, among others, to

end the historical animosity among the peoples and states of the region. Visegrád has undertaken numerous initiatives, and since its revamping in 1998 has accorded particular significance to developing regional cultural ties and identity. The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which has gradually liberalised most trade among the members, and expanded to include Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, was a practical offshoot of Visegrád. Its members agreed in late 2002 that Croatia would join the Agreement in 2003.

Another regional initiative is the **Baltic Sea Council**. Born in 1990 from a Swedish-German initiative, this involves all littoral states of the Baltic Sea and has undertaken numerous functional initiatives on issues such as trade, fishing, environmental protection, co-operation on organised crime, and plans for gradual integration of energy markets. It has initiated co-operation between some of Europe's most wealthy, industrial countries (Germany and the Nordic states) with Poland, the Baltic states and Russia. This initiative also has the potential to enhance the EU's Northern Dimension, to which 'Poland attaches considerable importance'.

A third regional enterprise is the **Central European Initiative**. This 17-country body encompasses post-communist states from the Baltic to the Adriatic, including Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania. Much like the Baltic Sea Council, the emphasis has been on low-political functional issues. Its importance again is in facilitating co-operation among states with varying degrees of socio-economic development and whose prospects of EU entry range from definite to extremely unlikely. Poland assumes the CEI's rotating presidency in 2003.

Poland's overarching foreign policy aims

The biggest goal in Polish foreign policy was the programme of 'back to Europe' – the entry into key Western institutions. While the outcome is now known – Polish membership of NATO being achieved in 1999 and EU membership scheduled for 2004 – none of this was preordained, and the road has been bumpy. The Council of Europe, the 'antechamber' for other European institutions, requires a candidate polity to hold, inter alia, fully free elections. Poland's membership was delayed, and came after countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, because Poland's pathbreaking June 1989 elections were not fully contested.

More importantly, the general Polish view was there was an historical and culture claim to membership to key institutions like NATO and the EU. As Ireneusz Krzeminski wrote 'The picture of the Polish past is the history of national suffering and martyrology. Even educated Poles are sure their nation suffered more in history than any other European nation'.⁸ Polish leaders through the 1990s expressed Poland's moral and historical 'right' to membership. Hanna Suchocka, Prime Minister in 1992-93, for example, stated, 'It is not that we are "obsessed with having no roof after the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact" - as one EC politician suggested some time ago. It is not that we desperately look for some multilateral structure to take care of us The family of democratic West European countries ... is what we aim at. Not because we need some umbrellas, but *because we all share the same values and objectives*'.

In 1996 President Aleksander Kwasniewski declared, 'We do not see Nato membership as a protection against Russia or because we aspire to be the eastern edge of Europe. We think we have a *moral right* because it was here that the peaceful revolution started which made a united Europe possible'. Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz told the Sejm in March 2002, 'For us Europe is the civilizational, economic and political necessity'.⁹

These sentiments, however, often went unrecognised in official Western discourse on NATO and EU enlargement. Instead, criteria for accession were based, particularly for the latter, on economic performance and the ability to adapt to EU bureaucratic and administrative procedures.

The achievement of accession, therefore, must not be discounted. Poland has engaged in what has come to be called 'good international citizenship'. Foremost is peacekeeping, and Polish personnel have contributed to operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. NATO means obligation, including defence spending but also engaging in war. The Kosovan conflict, in which Poland participated as a new member of the Alliance was not popular in all circles. Former Chief of the Polish Army Staff

⁸ Ireneusz Krzeminski, 'The National Identity and European Consciousness of Poles', in Petr Drulák (ed.), **National and European Identities in EU Enlargement: Views from Central and Eastern Europe** (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2001), p. 67.

⁹ 'Information by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the fundamental directions of the Polish foreign policy (presented at the 16th Session of the Sejm on March 14th, 2002)', at <http://www.polandembassy.org/Policy/p4-1.htm>

Tadeusz Wilecki called the NATO operation 'barbarous', and referred to it as part of a Clinton doctrine which was analogous the Brezhnev Doctrine.¹⁰ Many others, however, deemed Poland's participation as a test, and subsequent proof, of being a mature and loyal ally.

The Polish Foreign Ministry refers to its contributions to the US-led operations in Afghanistan as contributing to the 'consolidation of the image of our country as a credible ally and active NATO member'. Poland's desire to be integral to international (namely, US-led) efforts on the war against terrorism is evident from official statements.

EU accession is a great achievement for Poland, and one not to be taken as a foregone outcome. But it is not pure gain and comes at a cost. The official Polish policy has been to enter EU 'on beneficial terms', and this seems a much more sensible posture – both for domestic Polish consumption and for EU relations – than some of the statements, for example, of the Klaus government in the Czech Republic that compared rule from Brussels to that of communist-era rule from Moscow.

The economic and political consequences of accession have been discussed elsewhere in this collection. The remainder of this paper will therefore turn to Poland's geopolitics in light of accession, and the obligations that Poland may assume.

EU membership: Poland as the eastern frontier

The primary factor is Poland becoming part of the EU's new eastern border. While Finland and the Baltic states border the Russian Federation, and therefore have important roles, Poland has, with Romania, the longest borders with future-non-EU states. Furthermore, Poland alone borders the three most challenging dimensions of the EU new border: Kaliningrad oblast, Belarus and Ukraine. The challenges of each, for Poland and the EU, will be discussed briefly.

Kaliningrad is an unusual piece of geography in Europe. A constituent part of Russia, this exclave is not contiguous to it and instead is framed by Lithuania and Poland. The Polish Foreign Ministry states

¹⁰ PAP, 26 May 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 27 May 1999, cited in Rick Fawn, 'Perceptions in Central and South-East Europe', in Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings (eds),

that Kaliningrad ‘merits particular attention’. But while the Russian province is close to the core of Europe, it suffers enormous social and economic disparity that places it among the poorest parts of Russia. To cite the Polish Foreign Ministry, ‘the region is beset with an immensity of problems, including organised crime, environmental pollution, the condition of the health service and drugs trafficking’. A visa regime for Russian residents of Kaliningrad has been under negotiation. But the socio-economic weakness of the province, and its placement between two future EU members, poses risks to the integrity of the EU’s new eastern frontier. Poland will have to play a careful role in the management of Kaliningrad.

After Milosevic’s Serbia, among European states Belarus has probably most decidedly rejected Western political norms and practices. Political repression is considered so severe that the EU referred to the country as ‘totalitarian’. Latvia and Lithuania and Poland are the three EU applicant countries bordering Belarus, and given Poland’s larger size, and its centrality in east-west movement in Europe, will again assume a leading role in the EU’s frontline dealings with Belarus. Polish official statements advise that the ‘EU should not lose sight of a country that will be living right next to an enlarged Union’. Poland’s eastern policy specifically declares that the EU should ‘apply uniform criteria and identical standards to all states established in the post-Soviet space’.¹¹

But Poland’s dealings with Belarus must be different from the EU. Belarus is home to as many as 500,000 ethnic Poles, and they could easily suffer reprisals for Belarussian dissatisfaction with Western policy. It is not surprising that in the Sejm’s June 2001 foreign policy Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski referred to Belarus as ‘a difficult experience of our eastern policy’.¹² That may be compounded by divergent views between the rest of the EU and Poland on how to confront Belarus in future. In but a small example, the EU-funded construction of a new border crossing between the

Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath (London and New York: Continuum, 2001), p. 138.

¹¹ Polish official were expressed, for example, in ‘The Eastern policy of the European Union in the run-up to the EU’s enlargement to include Central and Eastern Europe Poland’s viewpoint [sic]’, Warsaw, 13 June 2001, at: <http://www.polandembassy.org/Policy/p4-5.htm>

¹² Report by Mr. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, on the tasks of Polish foreign policy in 2001, The Diet, 6th June, 2001, at <http://www.polandembassy.org/Policy/pliki/2001/mid6-701.doc>

Polish-Belarusian border caused tensions when Warsaw opted to close the crossing for over a year. Belarusian officials charged that Poland's move infringed on Belarus's interests.¹³

By contrast, relations with Ukraine are pivotal but more positive. Polish foreign policy has recognised Ukraine as a major player in post-communist European affairs: 'A security-related political dialogue with Ukraine, given that country's geopolitical importance and direct neighbourhood, should also become one of the EU's Eastern policy priorities. Ukraine's independence is a stabilising factor which exerts a beneficial influence upon the countries of the region'. Co-operation between Poland and Ukraine has extended to plans for a joint military contingent that could form part of the European rapid reaction force.¹⁴ Poland has also supported Ukraine against Russian measures to build a gas pipeline through Belarus that would bypass Ukraine.¹⁵

While both Poland and the EU have stated that EU accession is 'not a practical proposition for Russia' or other post-Soviet states except the Baltic republics, Polish foreign policy has nevertheless (or perhaps because of that) been promoting eastward connections. 'We will do our utmost', the Polish foreign minister noted, 'to make sure that after the enlargement ... Europe is not divided'. Specifically, in relation to Russia, he went on, 'Poland is vitally interested in the intensification of this partnership'.¹⁶ Poland will have to be careful that EU tariff barriers and quotas do not affect those trading relations.

Poland in the EU: Future prospects

Some opposition to EU membership has always existed in Polish society. This is healthy and to be expected. The last general election in September 2001 was perhaps significant, however, in that political opposition to accession coalesced in a political party (Samoobrona), giving such sentiments added, institutionalised political voice. Notwithstanding those developments sight should not be lost of

¹³ ITAR/TASS, 9 Nov. 2001.

¹⁴ ITAR/TASS, 27 March 2002.

¹⁵ United Press International, 'Putin, Kwasniewski discuss gas pipeline', 24 Aug. 2001. The article wrote: 'Poland has objected to the plan since the construction of the pipeline would bypass Warsaw's neighbour and ally, Ukraine'.

¹⁶ <http://www.polandembassy.org/Policy/p4-5.htm>

the fact that the Polish political elite unambiguously agree on the general Western orientation of the country. The Polish population has also demonstrated some of the highest and most consistent support for membership among candidate countries. Perhaps most importantly, the government position in pursuing negotiations with the EU is also strong because of the unity between parliament and the executive with the dominance of centre-left forces.

The economic dimension of EU accession is crucial to Polish interests: economic subsidies and the future allocation of the Common Agricultural Policy and Regional Development funds are core issues in enlargement, and current recipient states fear dilution of these funds to the new entrants.

To safeguard and advance Polish interests in this context Poland's best strategy may be to champion regional co-operation and hold a lobby together. Rather than being marginalised by accession, regional initiatives – foremost Visegrád – could assume new meaning as caucuses within the EU. As the Polish prime minister, Jerzy Buzek, said on Visegrád's tenth anniversary in 2001, the association was 'proving its worth as a forum for cooperation on the path towards membership in the European Union'.¹⁷ If Visegrád was useful in the accession process it could also prove useful in dealing with matters of common regional interest from within the Union. After meeting in Slovenia said in October 2002 the foreign ministers of Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland noted that 'co-operation could be further enhanced' because of their EU membership.

The opportunities and the responsibilities that will fall to Poland with EU membership will be great. Foremost among them will be those that

¹⁷ 'Ten questions on the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Visegrad Group', in 'International Visegrad Fund', 1 Jan, 2001 at <http://www.visegrad.org>

come from Poland's pivotal placement on the EU's new eastern frontier. But in return for the responsibilities that Poland will undoubtedly shoulder so too should there be some reward. The rewards, however, cannot be taken for granted, and harnessing some of the pre-accession achievements of Polish diplomacy could also prove very beneficial post-accession.

Some Economic Perspectives on EU Enlargement

Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz

Vice-President, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London

Introduction

The fifth enlargement of the European Union presents us with an historic opportunity: the political and economic reintegration of the continent after half a century of forced division. If handled properly, EU enlargement will strengthen both the existing EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Benefits will be political as well as economic. The political stability that the EU has brought to Western Europe since the end of the Second World War will be extended to the countries further east. Developments in South Eastern Europe provided a wake up call that political stability should never be taken for granted but requires constant efforts in building political mechanisms that can defuse tensions and prevent crises.

The economic benefits of enlargement are likely to arise everywhere but are most concentrated in the accession countries. Immediate economic benefits for existing EU members are most likely to come from the fact that the enlargement process puts pressure on existing member countries for the necessary implementation of institutional reforms. For instance, current EU agricultural policies are widely perceived as being in need of substantial reform. Extending them further east could ultimately prove very expensive as well as shaping the wrong incentives for farmers in the accession countries. This is already putting pressure on the EU to rethink its agricultural policies. Let's consider some of the benefits of EU enlargement.

Benefits for all

The opportunity to bridge old divisions and secure peace, stability and prosperity

It has been widely acknowledged that peace and political stability are a prerequisite for a prosperous economy. The *raison d'être* of the founding fathers of the EU was exactly this 'to create peace and stability throughout Europe by integrating the economies and the policy of the European continent'. Therefore extension of the stable and prosperous EU to Central and Eastern Europe will not only bring

elevated security and stability for the EU and the candidate countries, but also more aggregate economic prosperity throughout the enlarged EU. Accession is also an historic opportunity for the existing EU and the candidates to bridge the old dividing line between Western Europe and the post Communist Countries. Any failure of both the EU and the candidate countries to co-operate more closely would have dire effects on the European integration process and the EU's close neighbours.

Benefits of EU accession for the candidate countries

Political

?? **Stability:** The violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated once more the benefits of international co-operation. The EU is an important element of the international structure that has led to political stability in Western Europe since the Second World War. It can also be expected to play a similar role in resolving conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the future and between Eastern and Western European countries.

?? **An anchor for reform:** The EU anchor has a strong impact on the pace of reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The *acquis communautaire* – the body of EU legislation – locks in the reforms pursued by the governments of the EU applicants, but also brings areas where change is required to policymakers' attention. The adoption of the market regulations of the EU also makes reforms irreversible. The effects of the EU as an anchor for reform is growing over time as the nature of transition changes and progress is made. It also gives domestic politics an agreed overriding agenda which helps in the resolution of internal political conflicts.

Economic

?? **Economic growth and stability:** Accession will provide the stimulus to a far greater integration of the economies of the candidate countries with those of the EU-15. When accession takes place, it will provide the guarantee of a similar business and legal environment throughout the whole of the enlarged Union. The parallel stability for the new EU members will significantly diminish the investment risk for business. In addition, accession will give the candidate countries full access to the single market so increasing their growth potential. Both access to a larger market and increased

trade will contribute to GDP growth. The accession countries will not only grow faster on average than the older EU members but they will also experience substantial real currency appreciation so fuelling a faster pace of economic convergence.

- ?? **Structural reform:** Accession enhances the pressure for structural reform as countries *have* to comply with the *acquis*.
- ?? **Trade integration:** East European countries will benefit greatly from full integration into the common market. They will be able to fully exploit their strategic advantage in low labour costs and a highly skilled labour force.
- ?? **Increased flow of investment:** Most accession countries have large investment needs. EU and later EMU membership will increase investor willingness to enter the region as investment risks decline.
- ?? **Lower interest rates for many countries:** Accession will by itself bring downward pressure on interest rates and this will be reinforced as it becomes generally understood that this is also the first step towards adoption of the Euro. Later, introduction of the Euro can be expected to lead to markedly lower interest rates as it did in most of the current Euroland countries, reducing borrowing costs both for governments and firms.

Benefits to Western Europe: a window of opportunity

- ?? **Peace, stability and global influence:** A successful enlargement will clearly contribute to the stability of Western Europe and the EU but it will also increase the EU's prestige as an international organisation. This is not only important on a global level but also for close neighbours that may want to join the EU in the future. On the other hand a botched enlargement could have dire effects on countries that want to become EU members for instance in South Eastern Europe. Enlargement (and eventually a larger EMU) will give the EU greater global clout in trade negotiations, international monetary and financial reforms and matters of regional and global security. Whether such regional gains will be mainly at the expense of the rest of the world or become part of a positive-sum global experience depends very much on the EU's attitude towards the other key global players – the USA, Japan – as well as emerging market economies

and developing countries. Just as the creation of a customs union creates scope for trade creation and trade diversion so the creation of a closer form of economic and political union in Europe can benefit or damage the world outside.

- ?? **An ever-larger market:** The ten accession countries will increase the EU population by a quarter and add another 6 per cent to GDP. This gives existing EU members a much bigger market to play in. Nevertheless, in the short term the main accession benefit for Western Europe will come, as we noted above, from the pressure it puts on those countries and the EU to reform.
- ?? **Less exchange rate volatility:** East European countries' EMU membership will reduce the share of transactions exposed to exchange rate risk not only for companies in East and Central Europe but also for those in existing member countries. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently gives Eastern Europe a weight of 9 per cent in its trade-weighted exchange rate. This is likely to increase rapidly as the eastern European economies catch up and their markets become more important for Western European producers.
- ?? **Pressures for reform and change:** The creation of a true internal market with higher factor mobility increases the pressure on countries for structural reforms. Furthermore, increased competition for capital and labour puts pressure on the countries' public sector. This will lead to better governance through streamlining tax and licensing systems and also to efficient resource use in the public sector. Thus, while Europe is still lagging behind the US in many areas of structural reforms, it is likely to catch up. Given that the Eastern European countries have relatively flexible labour markets and low wages this momentum is going to be enhanced. Accession and the opening of Western European labour markets for the population of the accession countries puts much needed pressure on Western European governments to reform their own labour markets. The current EU is in need of reform and accession raises awareness of these matters. This is true for institutional reasons (decision taking is increasingly difficult) but also relates to such important matters as agricultural policies and the allocation of structural funds. Institutional reform is widely perceived as a precondition for reforms in other areas and is intimately linked to accession. There is consensus that under existing practice the EU would become ungovernable when at least 10 new members join. Thus accession is the driving force behind institutional reform: it is no coincidence that the Nice summit that opened the door irrevocably for accession also addressed institutional

reforms. The Nice treaty scrapped national vetoes in 29 areas out of 70 still subject to unanimity, although it failed to include controversial areas like taxation, social security and immigration. In the next EU budget (2007) qualified majority voting will be applied to the distribution of funds to poorer regions. Each new entrant will have one commissioner, while the number of commissioners of the large countries will be reduced accordingly to keep their total number at 27. While Nice was a step in the right direction, there is widespread belief that more internal reforms will be necessary to keep the EU functioning smoothly when more countries join

Poland

So, what about Poland? For Poland, as a candidate country, joining the EU implies that it will integrate with an economic area that enjoys higher living standards, a more efficient allocation of resources, higher levels of productivity and higher levels of human and physical capital. It also means that our economy after joining the EU will face competition from companies that generally operate under a more productive, efficient and stable business environment, supported by a liberalised framework and economic policies which guarantee a certain degree of low inflation, low public and external deficits, and stable exchange rates. To be ready to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU after accession, Poland must complete the process of modernisation and privatisation and continue necessary structural reforms enhancing efficiency and greater flexibility in factor and goods markets. We also need to improve the investment climate to attract more foreign direct investment (in particular green-field investments). We need to facilitate financial sector development to be able to effectively channel savings towards productive investments – especially those creating new jobs. Poland has to strengthen significantly its macroeconomic stability.

Further fiscal consolidation is needed leading, in due course, to budgetary balance. Reform of public finance is a priority today, aimed at improved flexibility of budgetary expenditure and, at the same time, its rationalisation and reduction. On the revenue side, the tax burden on the private sector, particularly on labour income, needs to be reduced in the medium-term to create growth-compatible incentives. Equally important, expenditure and tax reforms are needed to promote economic efficiency.

Further reform is also needed in the labour market, where unemployment (17.6% at the end of September 2002) is still high, mainly due to economically profitably but socially painful structural reforms. High unemployment was caused by the fall in the dynamic of output and the implementation of restructuring programmes. Unemployment is the result not only of an increase in the working age population but of high unit labour costs, and lower technological and innovation-oriented investments. This forces far-reaching labour market reform.

With the right policy mix – an optimal combination of fiscal and monetary policy should be conducive to growing investment and job creation. Favourable conditions for loosening monetary policy are: lower inflationary pressure, a safe level of current account deficit and progress in public finance consolidation. The proper combination of tight fiscal policy and more expansionary monetary policy should, in the long run, facilitate higher economic growth with external balance.

Accession will entail the co-ordination of candidate countries' economic policies with those of the other member states and progress with economic and monetary convergence. This should improve economic and monetary stability in the candidate countries. A new wide economic area enjoying growing incomes, low inflation, fiscal discipline and sustained growth provides an excellent incentive for European business. Macroeconomic stability in the enlarged single market will generate a favourable business climate and encourage investment from EU entrepreneurs. It will also accelerate the achievement of a high degree of sustainable real and nominal convergence that is a main precondition of joining EMU.

For Poland EU membership should accelerate 'catch-up'. The possibility and ability to take advantage of substantial structural funds, especially in the areas of environmental protection, transport policy and unemployment will underpin strong and durable economic growth. From 2004 through to 2006 Poland might receive between four and seven billion Euros per year in such assistance. This is a very substantial increase on the pre-accession inflow of less than €1 bn (from the EU's PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD programmes combined). This financial assistance will have a significant impact on economic growth not only on the transitory demand-side but also its more important long-term supply-side due to gains in productivity and competitiveness arising from much improved stocks of infrastructure and human capital.

Conclusion

In conclusion, enlargement represents an obvious potential net gain for the accession countries and for the EU but sustained effort is needed on both sides to realise and maximise those benefits. An open,

outward-looking enlarged EU is something worth working for. The first lesson of economics is that the economic game can be arranged to be 'positive sum'. Let's try to make sure that also happens with the next enlargement.

Poland and the Political Challenges of ‘Europe’

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Introduction

Poland is on the eve of membership of the European Union. The December 2002 European Council summit in Copenhagen confirmed that Poland be admitted to the EU in the next wave of enlargement in 2004. It has been a long and difficult path for Poland. In her paper Dr Gronkiewicz-Waltz highlighted some economic aspects of this process and here we turn to political challenges facing Poland. Much has been achieved. Today Poland is a liberal democratic state based

upon the rule of law. Its foreign policy has been re-focussed from Moscow to Brussels. A new constitution exists. Major political, social and economic reforms have been implemented. But problems and challenges remain. They include the rise recently in public life of Euro-sceptic or anti-EU parties. In this paper we examine Polish attitudes to politics and to Europe.

The Polish Road to the European Union

Solidarity's historic victory in the semi-free elections of June 1989 and the appointment, that August, of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the first non-communist prime minister in the entire Soviet bloc for over 40 years, led to a reorientation of

Poland's foreign policy from Moscow to Brussels and to the establishment of Poland as a liberal democratic state based upon the rule of law. These were huge political achievements. From the very beginning, Mazowiecki and other leading Polish politicians spoke of their desire for Poland to *return to Europe*. In December 1991 the Solidarity-led government signed an association agreement with the European Community. When a government composed largely of former communists was returned to power in October 1993, there were fears, quickly shown to be unfounded, that it would not be committed to EU membership. The post-communist SLD-PSL coalition (1993-97)

submitted Poland's official EU membership application in April 1994. In January 1997, the same government published Euro 2006 and the National Strategy of Integration. The former declared that integration with the EU should be followed by accession to the Eurozone as quickly as possible while the latter repeated the opinion that Polish membership of the EU was a strategic goal. In 2002 and 2003 another SLD-dominated government is bringing the accession negotiations with the EU to a successful conclusion.

Table 1 - The Polish road to EU membership

***September 1989* – Poland’s first Solidarity
government elected, Tadeusz Mazowiecki becomes
prime minister**

***December 1990* – Application for EU ‘Association’
submitted.**

December 1991 – Europe (Association) Agreement signed.

September 1993 - A ‘post-communist’ (SLD-PSL) coalition government formed.

February 1994 – The Europe Agreement comes into force

April 1994 – Poland officially applies for EU membership.

October 1994 – Poland’s application for membership formally accepted at the Luxembourg summit.

April 1997 – A new constitution adopted.

September 1997 – A Solidarity (AWS-UW) coalition returned to power.

March 1998 – Accession negotiations begin.

September 2001 – The return to power of another post-communist (SLD-PSL) coalition.

December 2002 – The Copenhagen Summit ends the negotiation process and confirms that Poland may join the EU in 2004.

The EU accession process had serious legal implications for Poland forcing the adoption of a new constitution to replace the ‘small constitution’ of 1992. This was needed since the latter did not allow the incorporation of internationally agreed statutes to domestic law. Articles 90 and 91 of the new 1997 constitution solved this problem. National sovereignty was a major issue in the ratification debates. Understandably, such a fundamental change to constitutional and legal practice, especially after so many years of Soviet domination, was

difficult for sections of the Polish public to accept.

Elite consensus on EU membership under pressure

Poland's political landscape was altered significantly by the September 2001 parliamentary elections. As expected the opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) won the election –extending a trend that saw it steadily increase its vote from 13 per cent in 1991, through 21 per cent in 1993 and 27 per cent in 1997, to 41 per cent in 2001.

Table 2 Polish General Election Results – 2001 and 1997

	2001		1997	
	% vote	Seats in Sejm	% vote	Seats in Sejm
Above threshold for seats in Sejm:				
SLD-UP (Democratic Left Alliance – Labour Union)	41	216	32 (27+5)	164
PSL (Peasants' Party)	9	42	7	27
Samoobrona (Self-defence)	10	53	1	0
PO - Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)	13	65	---	0
PiS - Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc(Law and Justice)	10	44	---	0
LPR - Liga Rodzin Polskich (League of Polish Families)	8	38	---	0
Below threshold for seats in Sejm:				
AWSP (Solidarity Election Action)	6	0	34	201
UW (Freedom Union)	3	0	13	60

Note: *Mniejszosc Niemiecka* (German Minority) also received two seats at both elections.

More significantly with regard to Poland's EU membership, it was the first time that political parties – LPR (the League of Polish Families) and Samoobrona¹⁸ – openly wary of, or completely hostile to EU membership were elected to the Sejm.¹⁹ For the first time the elite consensus on EU membership looked to be under pressure (see John Reed, 'Election result may deal blow to Poland's EU hopes', **Financial Times**, September 25, 2001). Given that these were the last parliamentary elections before Poland's referendum on EU membership expected in June 2003, the presence in the Sejm of parties critical of the EU is likely to have a profound impact in the public debate on EU membership. In the local elections of October/ November 2002 the LPR and the Eurosceptic Samoobrona actually increased their share of the vote.

¹⁸ For further information on LPR's attitude towards the EU see **Rzeczpospolita** (August 12, 2002). Szczerbiak lists a series of unambiguously anti-EU statements by LPR leaders (see 'After the election, nearing the endgame: The Polish Euro-debate in the run up to the 2003 EU accession referendum', **Sussex European Institute Working Paper**, No 53, 2002). On Samoobrona see **Rzeczpospolita** (July 25, 2002) and **Gazeta Wyborcza** (December 4, 2002).

¹⁹ On growing euroscepticism in Poland see Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Explaining declining Polish support for EU membership', **Journal of Common Market Studies**, March 2001 or Janusz Mucha and Marek Szczepanski, 'Polish society in the perspective of its integration with the European Union', **East European Quarterly**, 2002, XXXV (4) and Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, 'The two sides of

Table 3 Polish Election Results – 2001 and 2002

	Share of the vote (%)	
	2001	2002
	Sejm	Local elections
Above threshold for seats in Sejm:		
SLD-UP (Democratic Left Alliance – Labour Union)	41	24.5
PSL (Peasants' Party)	9	11
Samoobrona (Self-defence)	10	16
PO - Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)	13	16.5
PiS - Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice)	10	(combined PO-PiS)
LPR - Liga Rodzin Polskich (League of Polish Families)	8	14.5

From an accession viewpoint the results were disturbing. Will support for the LPR and Samoobrona continue to increase? There is a danger that it might. Around 30 percent of the local election vote was won by the leading Eurosceptic parties and a further 6 percent by other right-wing anti-EU parties such as the

Union of Real Politics (UPR). Samoobrona voters are however almost evenly divided on the issue of accession. On the other hand only one third of LPR voters would vote ‘yes’ in an accession referendum. A survey²⁰ we conducted in 2001 also confirms that LPR support is associated with opposition to EU entry. This may be because LPR sympathisers, more than others, are afraid that the EU poses a threat to Catholic culture as Poland merges into a more secular Europe. But this relationship between LPR sympathies and attitudes to EU entry is

Politics, 3(3), 2002.

²⁰ The Polish National Election Survey (September 2001) is a random sample representative of the adult population of Poland (18 and above). It was funded by a grant from the Polish National Science Foundation (Komitet Badan Naukowych) to the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences with additional funding from the UK ESRC under grant R000223685 to Glasgow University. Fieldwork, by CBOS, started on 29 October 2001 and concluded on 11 November. 1,794 interviews were completed. The refusal rate was 22 percent. The data set has been weighted by gender, age, educational attainment, place of residence and economic activity. For further information see *Political Studies*, 51(1): 1-23 or email : c.mcmanus@socsci.gla.ac.uk .

weaker than some other dispositions, for example, LPR supporters have stronger views on the Church than on the EU.

Table 4 Links between party sympathies and ‘issues’

Issues, positions on...	Party sympathies								% who rate issue as of ‘extreme importance’ %
	SLD	Samo- brona	PSL	UW	PO	LPR	PiS	AWSP	
Unemployment: inflation also matters	—	-11	—	—	+12	—	—	—	84
Crime: tough on	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	55
Tax: flat percentage rate	—	-14	—	+18	+12	—	—	+13	37
Social safety-nets: no	—	-11	—	+11	+13	—	—	—	31
Agricultural subsidies: no	—	-19	-16	+13	+13	—	—	—	30
EU entry: yes	—	-22	-16	—	+13	-14	—	—	15
Foreign investment: welcome	—	-16	-16	—	+14	—	—	—	10
Role of the church: high influence	-23	—	—	—	+11	+32	+16	+26	9
Privatisation: fast	—	-20	-16	+14	+18	—	—	—	8
Treatment of former nomenklatura: punish	-34	—	—	—	—	+14	+15	—	4

Note: The figures reported are standard correlation coefficients x100, those less than 10 are not shown. All those reported are significant at the one percent level. Issues have been listed in order of ‘importance’.

Turning to Samoobrona we find that there is a fairly strong correlation between Samoobrona sympathy and simply agreeing that the EU is ‘bad for Poland’ but, by itself, that does not tell us much about the *reasons* underlying those attitudes. *Why* take this view? Several possibilities exist. It may be because of objections to the terms and conditions of entry. It may be due to fear that Polish culture will be eroded. It may be because of value Poland’s hard-won and recently acquired sovereignty. Perhaps an irrational

fear or hatred of foreigners exists? In our survey we asked respondents a wide range of questions about attitudes towards both 'Europe' and the 'EU'. The results are shown in the table below. Individuals with Samoobrona sympathies are afraid that EU entry will damage their living standards. Fears that EU entry will hit agriculture are less intense and fears that EU entry will hurt Polish state or private businesses, less still. Nor are sympathies with Samoobrona particularly strongly correlated with a 'keep the zloty' mood. There is not much evidence in Poland of a politically significant equivalent of the British 'keep the pound' sentiment. Nor, on the basis of our survey, is there much evidence that Samoobrona sympathies reflect fears that the EU threatens Poland's freedom, independence or culture.

Table 5 Links between party sympathies and European issues

	Party sympathies								
	SLD	Sam	PSL	UW	PO	LPR	PiS	AWSP	
<hr/>									
Attitudes...									
EU is bad for Poland	—	+18	—	-12	-15	+11	—	—	
EU entry would damage own family's living standards	—	+21	+16	—	-22	+11	—	—	
Tightening eastern borders is bad	—	+17	+10	—	-10	—	—	—	
Identity: exclusively Polish, not at all European	—	+16	+10	—	—	+13	—	—	
EU entry would damage agriculture	—	+15	—	—	-11	—	—	—	
Keep Zloty	—	+12	—	—	—	+10	—	—	
EU entry would damage Polish private enterprises	—	+12	—	—	-13	+11	—	—	
EU threatens freedom in central Europe	—	+11	—	—	-11	—	—	—	
EU threatens Poland's independence & culture	—	+11	—	—	-15	—	—	—	
EU entry would damage state enterprises	—	+10	—	—	-14	—	—	—	
An influx of foreigners with different culture would be bad	—	+10	+10	—	—	—	—	—	
EU officials are corrupt & wasteful	—	—	—	-10	-15	—	—	—	
Sovereignty more important than international co-operation	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

Notes: Correlations less than 10 are not shown. All reported are significant at the one percent level. Entries, other than the first line, are ranked in descending order of correlation with Samoobrona sympathies.

There is more evidence that Samoobrona sympathies reflect relatively parochial identities (identifying exclusively with Poland and not at all with 'Europe') alongside a marginal suspicion of foreigners as revealed in attitudes on whether an influx of foreigners 'from different countries and cultures' would make the respondent's local area a 'better or worse place to live and work'. Turning to the PSL, it seems that the intensity of views on EU matters is weaker than for sympathisers of Samoobrona but a fear persists that EU entry will damage living standards. On the other hand, for those expressing

sympathies with Poland's centre-right (PO) party the situation is close to a mirror image of Samoobrona. A strong correlation exists between PO sympathy and the expectation that living standards will *benefit* from EU entry – along with tendencies to deny that EU entry would threaten Poland's independence and culture.

What does all this tell us about the nature of support and opposition to EU entry? First, perhaps surprisingly, that individuals with SLD sympathies appear not to have strong views one way or the other on EU issues. It is surprising too that individual sympathy for the overtly anti-EU, LPR party, does not indicate strong EU views in general. At the grass-roots, if not at leadership level, sympathy for the LPR reflects concern for the status of the Church within Poland much more than any concern for the future of Poland's Catholic culture within an enlarged Europe.

Both support and opposition to EU entry is much more strongly linked to sympathy for the PO, PSL and Samoobrona. The main issue appears to be hopes and fears about EU membership on living standards. It also seems that Samoobrona sympathisers' opposition to EU entry is pragmatic, and *not* a reflection of cultural fright or xenophobic nationalism. It does not reflect attachment to symbols like the national currency. Indeed it does not even seem to reflect fears for Polish agriculture so much as fears for living standards. It is intensely practical. Our data lends support to the **Economist's** (June 29, 2002) claim that Samoobrona's voters and potential voters had 'grown from those hurt by the fall of communism to include those who fear being hurt by EU membership'.

Polish public opinion and EU membership

In the early 1990s there was a widespread expectation that Poland would be a member of the EU by the year 2000 and public levels of

support for the EU were extremely high (77 percent in June 1994 and a peak of 80 percent in May 1996). A low point was reached in July 2001 when only 53 percent of the Polish public supported EU entry. Recent opinion polls on EU membership (in January 2003, after the Copenhagen summit) reveal a jump in support for EU membership to 63 per cent from 59 per cent a month earlier. As to more detailed attitudes on EU membership's impact on society our (2001) survey suggested that 60 percent of respondents believed agriculture would suffer while 68 percent thought that state industry would be damaged. Polish public opinion is particularly sensitive to the political

implications of the reform of heavy industries (shipbuilding, mining and so on) as required by the EU. It was workers in those industries who led the struggle against communism resulting in its collapse. To make these workers redundant as a result of EU entry would be a betrayal of trust.

The Polish referendum on EU membership is scheduled to take place on 8 June 2003. It is worth noting a technical consideration here. A turnout of 50 percent is required to make the referendum constitutionally valid but in early 2003 parliament was still considering a Bill submitted by the Polish President, Aleksander

Kwasniewski, that would allow the final decision on EU membership to be made by the Sejm and Senate if turnout falls below the 50 percent threshold. Turnouts for parliamentary elections is usually rather low rarely reaching above 50 percent although turnout for presidential elections has been significantly higher (usually over 60 percent). Previous Polish parliamentary elections have had the following turnouts: 2001 (46.3 percent), 1997(47.9 percent), 1993 (52 percent) and 1991 (43.2 percent). Turnouts for presidential elections have been better. In 1990 the first ballot turnout was 60.6 percent and for the second ballot 53.4 percent. In 1995 the first ballot turnout was 64.7 percent and for the

second ballot 68.2 percent. In the 2000 elections which did not go to a second ballot the turnout was 60.1 percent.

Conclusion

Poland led the way in the defeat of communism so it is only fitting that it should be among the first of the Central and East European states to join the European Union. The Copenhagen summit in December 2002 was an especially poignant time for Poles: it took place on the twenty-first anniversary of the declaration of martial law. On that dark December day in 1981 all hope of returning to Europe appeared to have been destroyed. Now, in 2003, it is up to

the Polish people to decide whether they want to accept the Copenhagen invitation and open the next, more hopeful chapter, in Polish history.

Reconstructing Civil Society in Poland

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Introduction

In my student years, during the communist period in Poland, the concept 'civil society' was used only in the history of social thought classes. The term did not have any vital theoretical weight even in anti-communist and pro-democratic discussions. The situation changed however when the democratic opposition emerged and the process started, while communism still existed, of building a civil society. Real change came with the birth of the Solidarity movement in 1980. Solidarity was identified as a *social movement*, a concept that did not exist in the Polish sociological vocabulary before 1980. Afterwards sociologists tended to over-use the term. In December 1981 when martial law was declared, Solidarity was banned, and soon after the concept 'civil society' emerged as a useful and even necessary tool in the analysis of social change in 'late communist' society. North American writers (especially David Ost and Michael Bernhard)²¹ promoted the concept, one that owes its origin to the veteran Polish dissident Jacek Kuron. In 1977 Kuron described the pro-democratic movement not as an endeavour aimed at re-creating civil society, but rather as a movement trying to re-build independent social life under communism, based on informal relations in many important spheres, slowly undermining state controlled institutions.²²

In practice, the KOR²³ group of the 1970s and the wider democratic opposition developed one crucial independent activity: uncensored publishing. It is difficult to imagine the later emergence of the millions strong Solidarity without the special experience of four years of circulation of independent publications. Of course, this was just one of the underlying factors explaining the birth of Solidarity but one that was exceptionally important. The 1980s were much more difficult for civil society. Yet despite the problems the spheres of independent life became wider and are often linked to the unexpected 1989 collapse of the communist system. This suggests that civil society should today be in a good shape in

²¹ David Ost, **Solidarity and the politics of anti-politics. Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968**, (Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia 1990), especially ch. 4, pp. 55-74. Michael H. Bernhard, **The Origins of Democratization in Poland. Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980**, (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1993).

²² Jacek Kuron first redefined the aim of opposition as an activation of a civil society in 1974, see Jacek Kuron, 'Polityka i odpowiedzialność', (Politics and Responsibility), **Kultura**, Paris 1974, reprinted in **Aneks**, London 1984. See also Kuron, 'Notatki o samorządzie' (Notes on Self-Government), **Głos**, no.1, 1977, reprinted in **Aneks**, London, 1984 and in English as 'Reflections on a Programme of Action', **The Polish Review**, 1977, 22, no.3.

²³ KOR (*Komitet Obrony Robotników*), the Workers' Defence Committee, was established by Polish dissident intellectuals in September 1976 following the heavy-handed punishments of workers involved in strikes and protests starting with those in Radom in the summer of that year. See Ost or Bernhard above for further details.

Poland and other countries in the region. But what is the reality?

Civil society in Poland - three distinct viewpoints

It seems worthwhile to begin by reviewing dominant views on civil society among Polish social scientists.

One view that attracts much attention is that it is risky to say that civil society exists in Poland or other post-communist countries. This current of opinion contends that we have to build civil society and the process is long and hard. It is a pessimistic diagnosis based on the fact that more than forty years of life in communist Poland completely destroyed civil consciousness and traditions of citizens' activity as well as important practical skills on how to organise. Even worse, most citizens learned and absorbed attitudes quite opposite to those needed for positive civil society development. The people, it is argued here, don't know how to work for themselves, how to co-operate in the pursuit of common and shared aims. They don't know how to create social activity and, last but not least, they look for somebody—government and state institutions—to make things happen.²⁴

A second rather different view is that during 'real socialism', and especially during the martial law period in the 1980s, Poles did indeed develop great citizens' independent activity, but that the skills learned then and rooted in that very particular experience are not adequate to the post 1989 situation of fully fledged democracy and market economy. The point here is that activity of the 1980s was primarily directed toward *private goals* and had a distinctly anti-state character. This meant that it broke legal rules or was balanced on the verge of legality.²⁵

A third view, perhaps not very popular but one that I share, is that Solidarity was more an imaginative project of a democratic society than a simple project of a democratic state, and it *did* create some attitudes and expectations that are fundamental for civil society. First, it constructed a kind of participatory democracy. By involving citizens in public discussions it prepared the ground for political participation. Of course, all the many expectations connected with this vision, were not fulfilled, and the resulting disillusionment and even disappointment, became, in my view, an important obstacle to the broader development of civil, social activity. This experience fuelled a critical disposition towards the new post 1989 reality and especially towards the new political class, an important part of which consisted of people from the Communist Party, a category (alongside entrepreneurs, the intelligentsia and the rich) widely viewed as doing well in the transformation process.²⁶ This complex of 'bad feelings' is an important factor blocking social activity, especially in

²⁴ See for example B. Jalowiecki, G. Gorzelak, **Strategie wladz lokalnych**, UW Warszawa 1990.

²⁵ See M. Marody, 'Co nam zostalo z tych lat ... Spoleczenstwo polskie na progu zmiany systemowej', **Aneks**, London, 1991.

²⁶ Our research in two small towns of Mława and Szczecinek highlights the groups perceived to have done well out of the transformation.

small towns, encouraging people to focus mainly on individual, egoistic goals. Such disillusionment in the construction of the new order, one that did not involve the broad participation of citizens, helps explain one of the mysterious facts of Polish democracy—the low (lower than other countries in the region, for example the Czech Republic or Hungary) participation in elections.

Civil society at local level

The first view outlined above, that society is passive and individuals look for problems to be solved by others, or from ‘above’ appears, according to my research, not to be true in many small, local communities. In the last few years, notwithstanding low voting turnout, we are well on the way to developing self-governing institutions. It is possible to argue that the new, local self-governing administration really is rooted in local communities. While it is true to say that people tend not to go out and vote, and that they have a critical disposition towards local politics, at the same time they tend to evaluate positively the system of local self-government.

How do matters look from the viewpoint of the citizen in a small town where the process of change runs broadly and rapidly? It was the first Solidarity government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki that set the ball rolling on local government reform. The new law on self-government and local administration was one of the first and most important political reforms of the Mazowiecki period. But it was enacted almost without any wider social preparation and mobilisation. The first local election, in 1990, almost took people by surprise. In that period *everything* was changing: there was the great (Balcerowicz) economic reform, the first bankruptcies of state firms and unemployment, hitherto unknown in ‘Peoples Poland’ was soon to soar. The central state administration was also changing as new people came to office but this group and its sympathisers, mainly connected with Solidarity and the Church in the 1980s, was not so numerous. It is also worth bearing in mind that many Solidarity activists and other educated people, those who could have played an important role in the new set up, emigrated during martial law.

	Mława	Szczecinek
(% of respondents identifying the groups below as successful in transformation)		
1. Firm-owners (entrepreneurs)	25	19.5
2. Intelligentsia, managers, professionals	12	20
3. Rich people	24	16
4. Politicians, people in government	11	17
5. Ex-communists	11	16

From, I. Krzeminski, P. Spiewak, **Druga rewolucja w małym mieście**, Warszawa 2001, p. 187.

The remaining potentially active citizens had to do everything in a very short period. Some joined changing state structures at national level. Others became involved in the first genuinely self-governing local institutions. Still others chose to engage in revitalising the trade union movement and party political life. Some saw opportunities in the new economic system with its openings for business development. Less educated but still potentially active groups of citizens needed leadership. Unfortunately, the active group in local communities was usually too small and too busy. A real crisis of social leadership was one of the most important features of civil society development during the first years of post-communism in the early 1990s. Meanwhile the Church altered its tack and in those years sought to engage directly in political life further depriving communities of the independent organisational leadership that had been provided in the past by many local priests.

The old regime and its leading personalities at local level at first disappeared from the public scene but the post-communist parties soon developed an effective local organisational base. Meanwhile, also at the local level, the former 'oppositionists' active under the Solidarity banner faced a crisis. The sense of moral-political solidarity that was a sub-text within the organisation Solidarity became hard to sustain. Political differences rapidly changed the Solidarity community which became an unfriendly arena of bitter struggle. Some activists decided to stick with trade union Solidarity. Others entered politics directly. Some, disappointed by the in-fighting among former friends, just opted out, an immense loss for the development of civil society and the so-called third sector in general.

The local press is one of the strongest elements of civil society and during the early 1990s was strongly supportive of self-government developments. But such co-operation did not last for long and conflicts between the press and local authorities became, by 1994, a common feature. Conflicts arose for different reasons but often local authorities discontinued financial support for titles, mainly in response to critical articles about local councils or the mayor. In many towns newspapers were established officially representing the town council and the mayor.

In the first half of the 1990s conflict between still very fresh and unstable self-governments and third sector organisations was a quite typical situation in many local communities. Those conflicts intensified after the victory of post-communists parties in the 1993 general election and again after 1994 local elections.²⁷

At first, conflict reflected rivalry between people, usually with a similar Solidarity background, some of whom were involved in local government and others in independent organisations. Such independent

²⁷ Joanna Regulska has written much on this subject, see for example, 'Decentralization or (re)centralization: struggle for political power in Poland.', **Government and Policy**, 1997, vol. 15; 'NGO's and their Vulnerabilities during the Time of Transformation. Case of Poland', **Voluntas**, 1999; 'Local Government Reform', in **Transition to Democratic Poland**, Richard F. Starr, ed. (St. Martins Press, New York 1998). See also my article, 'In Search for a Model of Democracy in Poland' in **Civil Society, Citizenship and Learning**, A. Bron, M. Schemmann, eds. (Bochum Studies in International Adult Education, LIT 2001).

activity was often aimed at strengthening cultural institutions, and, in bigger town and cities, educational organisations. Many charitable bodies were established, for example in working with drug-addicts or those with HIV/AIDS. Most would agree that such organisations should be supported at the local level by towns or other self-government bodies. But in practice local authorities and social organisations frequently fought over money whether from Warsaw or from Brussels. As might be expected, in the first wave of post-communist democratisation many completely new foundations, mainly in Warsaw and the large cities, were set up. It is worth noting that in the second part of the 1990s central government and parliament declared war against the foundations and, more generally, third sector organisations.

The second phase of conflict was more directly political, between community initiative and local authority structures, between social organisation and democratic administrative structures. It could be also interpreted as a special form of politicisation of local and national public life, the consequence of the unfinished, and perhaps not even started process of dealing with the communist past. After 1993 the national public stage (and almost to the same degree, the local scene) was divided between 'post-communism' and 'post-Solidarity'. This division was sharp and in our research we found it to be a common feature in towns in quite different locations, for example in Mława to the north of Warsaw, Gizycko in the 'lake district' in the north-east, or even Oswiecim, near Kraków. This was the background to the coalition of centre-right parties in Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) which was so successful in the 1997 parliamentary election. By the time of the 1998 local elections the situation had changed a little and local actors, including local party organisations, were much more open in terms of co-operation across the (post-Communist/post-Solidarity) 'confessional' divide. Some saw this also as a good indicator of positive civil society development. But the politicisation of the local public scene was also destructive for many social initiatives. Local authorities started to support only 'our' groups, the sympathisers of 'our' political camp, to the detriment of genuinely socially useful initiatives.

What was the legacy for civil society of 'real socialism'?

To conclude, let us think once again about the legacy of 'real socialism' and its impact on the attitudes and actual potential for developing and strengthening civil society, especially the independent sector. What, in practice, did people draw from the experience of real socialism in the spheres of civil and social activity?

The popular suggestion, noted above, that the dominant inheritance was passivity and dependency on the state looks at first persuasive but closer examination shows that, at least in part, real socialism taught something more. Pioneering 1970s studies on local government (as an empirical concept the term was a theoretical exaggeration and much misused during those years), by Professor Wiatr and his colleagues and continued into the mid 1990s by Jerzy Bartkowski, found that younger people whose parents participated in social organisations (of course at that time licensed by the state), seemed much

more willing to take part in civil activity. So, even if social activity in real socialism was limited and controlled by the party-state, family traditions favouring participation rather than passivity seem to pass from one generation to another contributing to forming active, citizen attitudes²⁸.

Our research found ambivalent attitudes towards real socialism. On the one hand, people are not very interested in searching out organisations and institutions even where their participation could help them achieve some important goals. On the other hand, many groups, especially in the villages, do *not* have only negative experiences with social activity. In real socialism so-called 'voluntary activity for society' was an important institution. In cities it may have been completely irrational but in the villages it could really help to complete important and useful projects. For example, it was quite common during the 1980s, when state finances were weak, for the authorities to start a road or a school building project that simply could not be finished without citizens' help. In many places this practice taught people to co-operate and had a positive influence. Even today many local authorities, still strapped for cash, often refer to events of this kind when they want to mobilise citizens to participate in any important development.

We researched school reform in rural areas and found that old experiences were useful in creating organisations ready to 'take on' the local state apparatus. We found that where some of those authorities decided to close small schools in the countryside protests led to mobilisation and to the construction of new social organisations to defend schools. Protest was however more effective, faster and easier to build where any form of independent activity already existed. But even in places where protests against school closures were new and the first to be organised the legacy of real socialism was helpful. On the downside however protest movements like those we encountered tended to reveal an authoritarian rather than democratic aspect. Even in completely spontaneous joint-action certain people want to be unquestionable leaders whose voices should be treated as especially important. We observed that this led to quarrels and emotional conflicts between people otherwise trying to co-operate in rational discussions and negotiation. This authoritarianism in civil society development is the negative legacy of real socialism and indicates a disturbing lack of social confidence. People seem reluctant to confide in each other. Even if somebody is trustworthy enough to be chosen as a formal or informal leader there is not enough

²⁸ Bartkowski J, *Lokalne elity władzy w Polsce w latach 1966-1995*, Warszawa, 1996. Wiatr J.J. (red), *Władza lokalna u progu kryzysu. Studium dwu województw*, UW IS, Warszawa 1983 and in English in *Local Politics in Poland: Twenty Years of Research*, Wiatr, ed, Univeristy of Warsaw, Warsaw 1986.

basis for belief in his or her social motives. Worse still, individuals may also doubt their own motives in engaging in social activity and for many of those who would be 'activists' the private and family spheres become more tempting. We have here the moral problem of co-operation, the most important barrier in developing civil society, and the most dangerous legacy of real socialism: morality is problematic, a feature of the public sphere. In this context it is so easy to treat dishonest behaviour in social life as something 'normal' and acceptable.

Poland-Scotland – Mutual Inspirations in Modern Art (1)

Professor Richard Demarco

Kingston University

In my capacity as Professor Emeritus of European Cultural Studies at Kingston University and as the Director of the Demarco Gallery and European Art Foundation in Edinburgh I have been committed for many years to developing a cultural dialogue between Poland and Scotland in a wider international context. My work in this area began in 1963 when, as founder and director of the Traverse Theatre Gallery and co-founder of the Traverse Theatre Club, I promoted an exhibition in Edinburgh from Warsaw's famous poster museum. Since the Traverse was committed to presenting the work of European playwrights, including those from Eastern Europe, it was natural to display a graphic art that was so closely tied to theatre. The Demarco Gallery in Edinburgh emerged from the Traverse Club and in 1967 we launched our first exchange programme with Poland. My visits to Central Europe began, and I quickly saw that avant-garde art was alive, despite the unpropitious domestic political atmosphere, in Warsaw, Łódź, Wrocław and Kraków.

In 1972, as Director of the Edinburgh Festival Exhibitions of Contemporary Art, I organised an experimental summer school bringing together the visual and performing arts and introducing the genius of Tadeusz Kantor and his Cricot 2 Theatre to the English speaking world. In the following year Edinburgh became the meeting place of German and Polish avant-gardism personified by Joseph Beuys from Dusseldorf and Tadeusz Kantor from Kraków. A friendship and collaboration resulted that showed that it was possible, despite bitter memories, to bring together the cultural life of Poland and Germany. Shortly after, in collaboration with Ryszard Stanislawski, Director of the Museum Sztuki in Łódź, I presented an exhibition entitled 'Atelier 1972' which brought the work of over sixty Polish avant-garde artists to Britain. It proved that artistic ideas could cross any artificial political boundaries, such was the energy invested in the project. Its impact on the careers of two of the participants is recounted in part in the next paper by my friend, the artist, Zbigniew Makarewicz.

Zbigniew and his wife, Barbara Kozłowska, began a dialogue with Scotland in 1968. It continued in the years that followed despite the great difficulties that Zbigniew met and which made him a heroic figure in the days of Solidarity's fight against the Communist regime in Poland. As President of the Union of Polish Artists, he was imprisoned for his views on the role of the artist in society, views totally unacceptable to the Polish Communist Party. Zbigniew and his fellow artists helped strengthen the voice of Solidarity as Poles demanded freedom from political repression.

It was through many visits to Poland that I learned how the language of art can prove devastatingly effective against repressive political regimes. I also learned that Poland provides a special dimension that Europe needs to define its true identity. Poland is a miracle; against all the odds, it has survived. It kindles the spirit of the Italian 'Bella Figura' in the north of Europe, and, in so doing, links the culture of the Baltic with that of the Mediterranean. I have always been impressed by the Polish-Scottish-Italian dimension to Europe. As an Italo-Celtic schoolboy I saw this first hand when at Sunday Mass I studied the faces of the Polish soldiers kneeling alongside those in a different uniform, that of Italian prisoners of war. The tragedy of war and the reality of Europe could not have been better expressed than it was in Scotland in my Roman Catholic Parish church.

In 2003, the Second World War and the Martial Law period in Poland are distant memories, consigned to the books recording the late 20th century history of Europe. As Poland prepares to join the European Union, the Polish people need to believe more than ever in the power of their artists to express the concepts of freedom and civilised society which they upheld for so long with great tenacity. Poland expresses the creative soul of Europe. In this lies Poland's true identity and its value to the countries of the European Union.

Poland-Scotland – Mutual Inspirations in Modern Art (2)

Zbigniew Makarewicz

Warsaw

Maybe artists do their work in a totally independent way. Maybe they are still in splendid isolation like the British Islands. But they also like to contact each other, face to face. Dialogue has been a standard in arts for all time. Unfortunately, from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, Polish artists had too much isolation, too little dialogue and contacts both among themselves, with art critics and world art institutions. Scottish artists have done much to create East-West and North-South bridges.

In the early 1970s Richard Demarco and Iain Patterson became much involved in fostering Polish-Scottish co-operation in art. The Demarco gallery hosted a large exhibition of Polish contemporary vanguard art in Edinburgh in 1972. That was the beginning of a series of events crucial for the further development of Polish art: perhaps for Scottish art too. Those meetings and the dialogue that flowed from them were decisive in producing a triple effect: first, for Polish artists (such as Opalka, Rosolwicz, Kozłowska, Abakanowicz) it was a confirmation of their new artistic ideas; second, new possibilities in theatre were established (involving Kantor, Grotowski, Szajna); third, it was the opening of new inspirations for Scottish artists such as Patterson and Read, and through that dialogue, Ian Hamilton Finlay's art also became known and influential in Polish culture.

In the very early 1970s we often met troubles with the authorities in communist Poland. In May 1972 in an official exhibition hall in Wrocław, Barbara Kozłowska had a special show of her *Babel Gallery*, with an exhibition and interaction between artists and audience. It also included materials that had been sent by Scottish artists associated with the Demarco Gallery. The exhibition was interrupted by the communist party and some items were confiscated by the Militia. That year Richard Demarco invited Barbara Kozłowska, Jerzy Ludwinski and I to the Exhibition of the Polish Contemporary Art in Edinburgh. The invitation was not well received by the communist authorities who denied us passports. We decided to send our materials to Edinburgh by mail. Our prints and slides were published by

Richard Demarco in a catalogue that was out of reach of communist censorship. The exhibition won some good press in Britain but the Warsaw authorities refused to show it in Poland although a few articles did appear in the Polish papers.

In 1973 things changed and Barbara Kozłowska and myself were able to make our first journey across the Berlin Wall, to the other side of that rather artificial installation. We returned to Scotland in 1975 and even while sailing across the English Channel I felt I was coming back home. This time the destination of our long pilgrimage was Callanish where megalithic stone circles from the prehistoric age talked to each other, a sacred spot of wind and ocean.

An artist has at least two homelands. The first one is a land of childhood – the paradise lost. The other is chosen for the sake of art. My first homeland is Lithuania, lost along with childhood. The other is Scotland. Neither electric fences, police, nor hostile guards separate me from my homeland now. No human being does it. There are only rivers, seas, miles or kilo metres. There is also a third homeland – Poland. It was not easy to find Poland in the Polish Peoples Republic. We had to look for her. We had to create her in our families, our ateliers and churches. And we found our Poland in Scotland too.

In Scotland we made many friends. We recovered our homeland and we obtained a new one. Regular visits of our Scottish friends when we were not allowed to go abroad were deeply meaningful. Their exhibitions in our small gallery were real islands of freedom. They fed hope in Poland. I don't know if Richard Demarco wanted to overthrow communism in Poland but his good contacts with artists, some of whom had quite bad relationships with the communist regime were of great importance to us.

We face new, different problems today. In Poland the establishment seems full of reservations towards creative art. Our contemporary problems in art may be universal. One thing however is certain and it is a lesson from the past: we must be active in developing our co-operation rather than meekly accepting the standards of any well-entrenched establishment.